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A commitment scheme allows one to commit to hidden information while keeping its value re-
coverable when needed. Despite considerable efforts, an unconditionally and perfectly secure bit
commitment has been proven impossible both classically and quantum-mechanically. The situation
is similar when committing to qubits instead of classical bits as implied in the no-masking theorem
[K. Modi et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 120, 230501 (2018)]. In this Letter, we find that circumvention of the
no-masking theorem is possible with the aid of classical randomness. Based on this, we construct an
unconditionally secure quit-commitment scheme that utilises any kind of universal quantum maskers
with optimal randomness consumption, which is distributed by a trusted initializer. This shows that
randomness, which is normally considered only to obscure the information, can benefit a quantum
secure communication scheme. This result can be generalised to an arbitrary dimensional system.
In a commitment protocol, a sender (say Alice) com-
mits to a secret value in the way that a receiver (Bob)
cannot access the value until it is revealed. On the other
hand, Bob should be able to reject Alice’s cheating of
revealing a value different from the originally committed
value. A commitment scheme, which has many crypto-
graphical applications[1, 2], is said to be unconditionally
secure when the scheme does not depend on the compu-
tational power of both participants, while it is perfectly
secure perfectly secure when the scheme works with zero
probability of failure. However, an unconditionally and
perfectly secure commitment protocol is impossible. If
a commitment protocol is unconditionally and perfectly
binding, which means that any attempt of Alice to change
the already committed secret value can be detected by
Bob, then there should be a unique secret value for each
commitment provided by Alice to Bob. If so, the pro-
tocol, however, cannot be unconditionally and perfectly
concealing, i.e., Bob could have some information about
the committed value before Alice discloses it, because
Bob with unlimited computational power can reveal the
secret value by searching through every possible secret
values and corresponding commitments.
Quantum bit-commitment is an attempt to circumvent
this difficulty by using quantum mechanics [3]. However,
it has been proven [4, 5] that an unconditionally secure
commitment of a classical value is impossible even with
the aid of quantum mechanics. Meanwhile, a fully clas-
sical breakthrough was developed by Rivest [6] as intro-
ducing a partially credible mediator, “trusted initializer,”
who is only involved in the beginning (setup) of the pro-
tocol and does not receive any information during the
remaining protocols. In Ref. [6], it was shown that the
trusted initializer enables the construction of uncondi-
tionally secure commitment schemes for classical bits.
Recently it transpired that the situation is similar for
qubit commitment, in which the commited secret value is
a qubit. A result recently proven by Modi et al. [7] known
as the no-masking theorem states that it is impossible to
encode quantum information in a bipartite pure quantum
state so that it is inaccessible to local subsystems. As a
corollary, an unconditionally and perfectly secure qubit
commitment is also forbidden [7]. It shows that qubit
commitment schemes with straightforward protocols are
vulnerable to entanglement-based attacks [7].
One might expect that the no-masking theorem can be
extended to mixed states similarly as the case of the no-
broadcasting theorem [8] extended from the no-cloning
theorem [9]. In this Letter, however, we show that this is
not the case. We first prove a stronger version of the no-
masking theorem by showing that one additionally needs
at least log2 d bits and 2 log2 d bits of randomness re-
spectively when entanglement is available and when only
zero one-way quantum discord is allowed in the masked
bipartite quantum state. We then introduce a simple way
to circumvent the strengthened no-masking theorem by
constructing explicit examples of quantum masker that
consumes the minimal amount of randomness.
We further show that the class of universal quantum
maskers that consume uniform randomness can be used
for unconditionally secure qubit commitment schemes by
introducing a trusted initializer, whose role is very simi-
lar to that of Rivest’s commitment scheme. Our scheme
has a security advantage over Rivest’s scheme even when
applied to the bit commitment as it avoids a certain type
of security failure.
Quantum Masker.— According to Modi et al.’s def-
inition [7], masking quantum information is encoding
quantum information in a composite quantum state with
the information hidden from both the subsystems and re-
maining only in the quantum correlation between them.
The technical definition in Ref. [7] only considers pure
composite states so that the encoding of correlations are
only allowed in the forms of entanglement. We note that,
however, there are quantum correlations beyond entan-
glement [10, 12, 13] in the case of mixed states. A typical
example would be the states with no entanglement but
having non-zero quantum discord [14]. Therefore, we re-
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FIG. 1: Circuits for some examples of universal quantum maskers. (a) In the 4-qubit masker, the output state is
partially entangled in general. (b) In the 3-qubit masker, the output state is always a classical-quantum state
therefore separable. ρin denotes the input state and
1
2 denotes a qubit in the maximally mixed state.
define the quantum masker to encompass the processes
that encode quantum information in any kind of quan-
tum correlations.
Definition 1. An operatorM from B(HA) to B(HA′ ⊗
HB′) is said to mask quantum information contained in
states {φkA ∈ B(HA)} by mapping them to {ΨkA′B′ ∈
B(HA ⊗HB)} such that all marginal states of ΨkA′B′ =
M(φkA) are identical, i.e.,
ρA′ = TrB′ ΨkA′B′ ,
and
ρB′ = TrA′ ΨkA′B′ ,
with an unmasking operator U from B(HA′ ⊗ HB′) to
B(HA) such that
U(ΨkA′B′) = φkA
for all k. We call suchM a (quantum) masker and we say
thatM is universal if it can mask an arbitrary quantum
state.
The condition on the existence of recovery, or unmask-
ing map is crucial, since without it, a simple erasure map
would qualify as a universal masker. Besides, the exten-
sion of universal masker to arbitrary mixed state input
is natural, since, from the linearity of quantum channel,
a masker that can mask every pure state can also mask
arbitrary mixture of pure states. Therefore, every univer-
sal quantum masker ΦM is demanded to be an invertible
quantum process. Such process can be always expressed
[18] in terms of a quantum state ωS and a unitary trans-
formation M which maps the input system C and the
ancillary system S to the systems A and B such that
ΦM (ρ) = M(ρC ⊗ ωS)M†
for every quantum state ρ with some ancillary state ωS .
We will call the ancillary state ωS of a masking process as
the safe state in the sense we put quantum information
ρ into a secure safe. The no-masking theorem states that
there is no universal masking process ΦM with a pure
safe state. This raises a natural question : is it possible
to mask quantum information with non-pure safe state?
It turns out that it is indeed possible and we intro-
duce two examples. (Fig. 1) The output systems with in-
dex Ai and Bi belong to Alice and Bob, respectively. In
each case, discarding one party’s quantum state yields
the maximally mixed state for the other party. Both
maskers can be easily generalized to d-dimensional uni-
versal maskers by replacing X and Z gates with their
d−dimensional generalizations and the maximally mixed
state 121 with its d−dimensional counterpart 1d1.
An interesting example of universal masker is the 3-
qubit masker introduced in (b) of Fig. 1. The 3-qubit
masker does not form any entanglement and quantum
discord with measurement on Bob’s side for any input
state, but still masks a qubit of quantum information.
The systems B1 and B2 are in classical states, there-
fore they can be transmitted through a classical channel.
The output state has, nonetheless, non-zero quantum dis-
cord with measurement on Alice’s side for a generic input
state.
We observe that a mixed safe state generated from
an independent randomness source is required to mask
quantum information. How much randomness is, how-
ever, required for a universal masker? Asking this ques-
tion is appropriate given the recent trend in computer
science and quantum information theory of treating ran-
domness as a resource [11, 15, 16, 18]. We derive a lower
bound on the randomness of the ancillary state ωS below.
Theorem 1. Let ωS be the safe state of a universal quan-
tum masker ΦM for a d-dimensional quantum system.
Then, the von Neumann entropy of ωS is lower bounded
by log2 d.
We note that this theorem has the no-masking theorem
as its corollary, since the no-masking theorem states that
there are no universal quantum maskers that consume
zero amount of randomness.
This lower bound of the randomness cost is, however,
achievable only if entanglement between A and B for the
masked state is allowed. This is because of the following
trade-off relation between the strength of quantum cor-
relation allowed between A and B and the randomness
cost of quantum masking.
Theorem 2. Let ωS be the safe state of a universal quan-
tum masker ΦM for d-dimensional quantum system. If
3the masked state ΦM (ρ) for any ρ is separable, then the
von Neumann entropy of ωS should be strictly larger than
log2 d. If the quantum discord D
←(A : B) of the masked
state ΦM (ρ) for any state ρ vanishes, then the von Neu-
mann entropy of ωS is at least 2 log2 d.
This theorem shows that minimal randomness con-
sumption of log2 d bits is only possible with the aid of
entanglement and any randomness cost saving from the
2 log2 d bits bound comes from utilizing quantum discord
in both directions. Theorems 1 and 2 and the examples
of universal quantum maskers given in Fig. 1 show that
these lower bounds are indeed minimal randomness costs
that are achievable.
One may ask after Theorem 2 that if it is possible
to mask quantum information without entanglement or
any quantum correlations. The answer is that quantum
correlations are a critical resource for masking quantum
states, without which masking is impossible even with
unbounded amount of randomness consumption.
Theorem 3. Universal quantum masking is impossible
without quantum correlation.
Qubit-Commitment.—— A typical commitment
scheme consists of two protocols COMMIT and
REVEAL involving two participants, Alice (sender)
and Bob (receiver). In the COMMIT protocol, Alice
commits her secret value to Bob, forbidding him from
learning anything about it until she allows him to. Later,
Alice discloses the secret value using the REVEAL
protocol. Bob should be able to reject the revealed value
if it is not consistent with the information provided
in the COMMIT phase. This prevents Alice from
pretending to have committed a value different from
the one in the COMMIT phase. For the scheme to be
secure, the following requirements are demanded:
Correctness : If every participant honestly
follows the protocol, Bob will possess the
value committed by Alice after the RE-
VEAL protocol.
Concealing : Bob has no information about
the committed value until the REVEAL
protocol begins.
Binding : Once the COMMIT protocol is
finished, any attempt by Alice to change the
committed value should be rejected by Bob.
We say that a condition holds perfectly when the
probability of the condition failure is zero. Even if the
probability of failure is non-zero, if it is possible to
make it arbitrarily small by increasing the security pa-
rameter, we still say that the security condition holds.
All the requirements except the binding condition can
be applied to qubit-commitment, or generally, qudit-
commitment schemes in which the value being committed
is a quantum state. The binding condition can be ap-
propriately modified to meet the inherent probabilistic
characteristic of quantum mechanics. Assume that Al-
ice commits her quantum state |ψ〉 by directly giving it
to Bob over a quantum channel, sacrificing the conceal-
ing requirement. Even in this case, Alice can insist that
she has committed a quantum state |φ〉, which is non-
orthogonal to |ψ〉, and still could be accepted by Bob
with non-zero probability, | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2.
Indeed the best fidelity achievable by Alice cannot be
lower than this, since if a quantum qubit-commitment
scheme allows lower best fidelity than this, then such
scheme can be used to distinguish non-orthogonal states
and thus breaks the no-cloning theorem or the informa-
tion causality [23]. If Alice’s best success probability of
revealing the state |φ〉 after committing the state ρ is ex-
actly 〈φ| ρ |φ〉, then we say that the scheme is perfectly
quantum binding. If the best fidelity a scheme allows is
not exactly 〈φ| ρ |φ〉, but converges to it as the security
parameter increases, i.e. the parameter that characterizes
the security of the scheme such as the rank of the safe
state increases, then the scheme is said quantum binding.
Now we propose an unconditionally secure quantum
qubit commitment scheme that utilizes a universal quan-
tum masker of a special kind. Consider a class of quan-
tum maskers for which the safe state ωS is the maximally
mixed state on its support. In other words, we consider
the case of ωS =
1
rΠsupp(ωS) where r is the rank of ωS
and ΠT is the orthogonal projection operator onto a given
subspace T . The 4-qubit masker and the 3-qubit masker
introduced in this Letter are maskers of this class with
ωS = |0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0| ⊗ 121 and ωS = 121 ⊗ 121, respec-
tively. We then let |Ω〉SK be a purification of the state
ωS , where the index S stands for the safe and K stands
for the key. From a fixed purification |Ω〉SK , we can de-
fine ωK := TrS |Ω〉〈Ω|SK and find an orthonormal basis
{|Ωi〉}r2i=1 on the space supp(ωS) ⊗ supp(ωK) that con-
sists of purifications of ωS , just like how the Bell basis is
defined.
Let us introduce a “trusted initializer,” Ted, who pre-
pares a quantum state and classical information and dis-
tributes them to Alice and Bob at the beginning of the
scheme. We trust Ted only to the extent that he cannot
take advantage of the result of the commitment scheme
because he never learns any information about the in-
put state. Our scheme consists of three phases SETUP,
COMMIT and REVEAL, and Ted participates only
in the SETUP protocol and exits the scheme after that.
(See Fig. 2.)
SETUP : Ted prepares a bipartite state
|Ωi〉SK randomly chosen from the an or-
thonormal basis {|Ωi〉SK}r
2
i=1. Then Ted ap-
plies a randomly chosen unitary USK on the
space spanned by {|Ωi〉SK}r
2
i=1 to the state
and distributes it to Alice and Bob. Ted tells
4SETUP COMMIT REVEAL
|0〉C ρC
MCS→AB
VA Alice
M†AB→CS
U†SK
Bob
USK
Ted
|Ωi〉SK
FIG. 2: A schematic description of the protocol. Lane 1-2 belongs to Alice, lane 3-5 to Bob, and lane 6-7 to Ted. ρC
gate denotes the preparation of the secret state ρC to which Alice commits, and VA denotes the unitary
transformation secretly applied on the system A by Alice to cheat Bob. Note that this diagram does not show the
classical information flow.
Alice the index i of |Ωi〉 and tells Bob the
unitary USK .
COMMIT : Alice prepares a secret state ρC
in the system C. Alice runs the masking uni-
tary MCS→AB on the systems C and S and
gets the output state in the systems A and
B. Alice sends the subsystem B to Bob and
keeps the system A.
REVEAL : Alice sends the system A to Bob
and reveals her commitment as |φ〉C and the
index i of the state |Ωi〉SK . Bob runs the un-
masking unitary M†AB→CS on the systems A
and B and successively applies the unitary
U†CS on the systems C and S. Bob measures
the output state to check if the system S and
K are in the state |Ωi〉SK . If they are, Bob
proceeds to check if the system C is in the
state |φ〉C . If either of the validations fails,
Bob rejects the revelation.
We provide the security proof of the qubit commitment
protocol by the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The initializer qudit-commitment scheme
is unconditionally and perfectly concealing and uncondi-
tionally quantum binding.
Details of the proof can be found in the Supplemen-
tal Material [22]. We highlight that an advantage of
our scheme over Rivest’s scheme is that it is perfectly
concealing without ‘collision error’. Rivest’s scheme de-
pends on the choice of a large prime number p and with
the probability of 1/p, Alice’s secret value and the evi-
dence provided by Ted could coincide (‘collide’), disclos-
ing the secret value to Bob in the COMMIT proto-
col. In our scheme, however, regardless of Alice’s choice
of the secret qubit, Alice’s secret qubit remains con-
cealed until the REVEAL protocol begins. This fact
enables the scheme proposed here to be applicable for
low-dimensional cases in contrast with Rivest’s scheme.
Another interesting observation is that Alice’s subopti-
mal strategy is to do nothing after the COMMIT pro-
tocol; the identity operation gives fidelity between the
target state |φ〉 and the originally committed state |ψ〉
arbitrarily close to the optimal value as r → ∞. More-
over, any possible fidelity enhancement in bounded from
above with (1− | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2)/(1 + r2) . In other words, our
scheme fundamentally suppresses Alice’s any kind of at-
tempts to harm the binding requirement and successfully
blocks the notorious entanglement attack [4, 5].
The initializer scheme, however, inherits the problem
of the Rivest scheme that it is not perfectly binding [6].
With the security parameter p for Rivest’s scheme, Alice
can guess the evidence given to Bob with the probability
of 1/p2. In the scheme proposed here, the success proba-
bility of deceiving Bob about the index i of the safe and
key state U |Ωi〉SK is generically non-zero and bounded
from above with r2/(r4 − 1). On the other hand, it is
important to prevent Bob from having any access to the
index i, otherwise Bob can infer the committed qubit
by measuring the system SK with the knowledge of the
state U |Ωi〉 before the REVEAL protocol.
Theorem 5. Ted learns nothing about the secret qubit.
This theorem justifies the introduction of the trusted
third party in to the scheme, since even if Ted is mali-
cious, it is impossible for Ted to attain any useful infor-
mation about the secret value. A certain amount of trust
is required, nevertheless, for collusion of Ted with either
of participants leads to failure of security conditions.
In a practical situation, Alice may not know the speci-
fication of the state |ψ〉 being committed, just as in quan-
tum teleportation schemes. In this case, in the REVEAL
5protocol, Alice cannot disclose the state |ψ〉 over a clas-
sical channel. For such cases, a scheme in which Bob’s
acceptance of Alice’s revelation with high probability im-
plies Bob’s possession of a quantum state with high fi-
delity with the secret qubit of Alice would be favorable.
We will say that such schemes have state-revealing prop-
erty and we show here the existence of a scheme with such
property. In this case, we only consider pure committed
states for this property does not depend on the uncer-
tainty of the input state, therefore one can assume the
input state is in some fixed pure state just as in quantum
teleportation schemes.
Theorem 6. The 3-qudit masker qudit commitment pro-
tocol with a trusted initializer has state-revealing prop-
erty.
Discussion.— We have generalized the no-masking
theorem suggested by Modi et al. [7] by introducing a
new framework that interprets quantum masking as a
task that consumes randomness in the process. In our
formulation, the usage of randomness is catalytic in the
sense introduced by Boes et al. [16], since after applying
unmasking unitary to the masked quantum state, the safe
state is completely recovered and can be used again.
Our results show that there are subtle constraints
for entanglement in tripartite quantum secret sharing
schemes. Theorem 3 proves that it is impossible to share
a quantum secret exploiting only genuine tripartite quan-
tum entanglement. Meanwhile, Theorem 2 implies that
there is a trade-off relation between the maximum quan-
tum correlation between A and B and the randomness
cost, i.e. the entanglement for the bipartition AB and C.
Quantum secret sharing scheme can be considered an
isometric embedding of the space of a single party quan-
tum state into the set of multipartite quantum states
with fixed marginal states. Therefore the study of con-
straints and costs of quantum secret sharing scheme is
important not only for practical applications but also for
its potential as a tool to investigate quantum phenom-
ena solely coming from quantum correlation by putting
them in comparison with the well-understood properties
of single-partite quantum states.
Recently, a qubit commitment scheme that can be im-
plemented in fully classical communication with a fully
classical receiver setting was suggested by Mahadev [26],
however, with a certain degree of assumption on the com-
putational power. Since the scheme suggested in this Let-
ter is unconditionally secure but requires quantum con-
trol capabilities on the receiver’s side, a combination of
both directions might yield a stronger result.
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6APPENDIX : PROOFS OF THEOREMS
——
Theorem 1. Let ωS be the safe state of a universal quantum masker ΦM for d-dimensional quantum system. Then,
the von Neumann entropy of ωS is lower bounded by log2 d.
Before proving this theorem we reprove a more general result for (k, n)−threshold quantum secret sharing schemes
given in [27] in a way that doesn’t rely on the strong subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy.
Lemma 1. Assume that ΦM : S(Cd) → S((Cd)⊗n) is the quantum map implementing a (k, n)−threshold quantum
secret sharing scheme. Then, for any ρ ∈ S(Cd), the marginal state ΦM (ρ)Ai of any system obtained by tracing out
the other n− 1 parties of the n-partite state ΦM (ρ)A1,...,An has the von Neumann entropy of log2 d or higher.
Proof. As every (k, n)−threshold quantum secret sharing scheme can be purified to a pure (k, 2k− 1)-threshold quan-
tum secret sharing scheme [17], we only prove the lemma for that case. In that case, the scheme can be implemented
with an isometry M : Cd → (Cd)⊗2k−1. Consider the input state ρ ∈ S(Cd) in the system C and its purification
|Ψρ〉EC with the purification system E. Then the isometry M outputs the state (1 ⊗M) |Ψρ〉EC distributed among
2k parties E and A1, ...A2k−1. Let D be an authorized subset of the parties {A1, . . . , A2k−1} of the size k containing
Ai and U be the unauthorized subset {A1, . . . , A2k−1} \D of the size k− 1. As a secret sharing scheme decouples any
unauthorized set from environment, we have
H(E,U) = H(E) +H(U),
where all the von Neumann entropies are defined for the output state (1 ⊗M) |Ψρ〉EC . Since (1 ⊗M) |Ψρ〉EC is a
pure state we have
H(E,U) = H(D),
and from the subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy we have
H(D) ≤ H(Ai) +H(U ′)
where U ′ := D \ {Ai} is an unauthorized subset of {A1, . . . , A2k−1} of the size k − 1. Therefore,
H(E) +H(U)−H(U ′) ≤ H(Ai).
Since the choice of the authorized set D was arbitrary barring the condition that it contains Ai, one can choose the
new D as {Ai}
⋃
U , which makes the new U ′, U . From the same argument we have
H(E) +H(U ′)−H(U) ≤ H(Ai).
By averaging two inequalities we have
H(E) ≤ H(Ai).
As the system E was defined as the purifying system of the input state ρ and remained intact through the secret
sharing process, H(E) = H(ρ). As ρ was arbitrarily chosen, however, we can take H(E) as its maximum value log2 d.
Note that this result can be considered a stronger version of Theorem 4 in [17]. By noting that a quantum masking
process is merely a (2, 2)−threshold quantum secret sharing scheme and the fact that any mixed quantum secret
sharing scheme can be obtained by tracing out irrelevant parties of a pure quantum secret sharing state, we can see
that the following circuit represents an implementation of a pure (2, 3)−threshold quantnum secret sharing scheme
among three parties, A,B and K.
E
MCS→AB
A
B
K
|Ψρ〉EC|Ω〉SK
Note that |Ψρ〉EC is a purification of the input state ρ and |Ω〉SK is a purification of the safe state ωS consumed in
the hiding process. The lemma says that H(K) ≥ log2 d, but as H(K) = H(ωS) we have the proof of the theorem 1.
7Theorem 2. Let ωS be the safe state of a universal quantum masker ΦM for d-dimensional quantum system. If the
masked state ΦM (ρ) for any ρ is separable, then the von Neumann entropy of ωS should be strictly larger than log2 d.
If the quantum discord D←(A : B) of the masked state ΦM (ρ) for any state ρ vanishes, then the von Neumann entropy
of ωS is at least 2 log2 d.
Proof. Let’s say ΦM (ρ) is separable for any pure state input ρ, then the fact following equality holds is evident from
the definition of quantum discord.
S(K) = I(A : B) +D←(A|K) +D←(B|K).
Here I(A : B) = S(A)+S(B)−S(AB) is the quantum mutual information betwenn A and B. However, as at least one
of the pairs AK and BK should be entangled for some pure state ρ, because if all three pairs AB, AK and BK are
separable, then the bipartite staet ΦM (ρ)AB should be classically correlated [28], but because of Theorem 3 below, it
is impossible to mask quantum information into classically correlated systems. Note that quantum discord D←(A|K)
is zero if and only if the system AK is in a quantum-classical state. Therefore for the given conditions, S(K) must
be strictly larger than I(A : B), which is in turn no smaller than log2 d. As S(S) = S(K), we get the first part of the
theorem.
Since D←(A : B) = 0, the state ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|) is a quantum-classical (QC) state [29] that has the form, where
TrA(ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|)) =
∑
i ti |σi〉〈σi|B is the spectral decomposition of the state of the system B independent of the state
|ψ〉〈ψ|,
ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
∑
i
qiρiA ⊗ |σi〉〈σi|B ,
with some quantum state ρi for each i. However, as ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|) = MCS→AB(|ψ〉〈ψ|C ⊗ ωS)M†AB→CS , ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
must have the same rank with the safe state ρS . Therefore every ρi must be a pure state, and we have
ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
∑
i
qi |ψi〉〈ψi|A ⊗ |σi〉〈σi|B ,
where for all i, |ψi〉 := Mi |ψ〉 for some operator Mi with 〈ψ|M†iMi |ψ〉 = 1. However, as ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
MCS→AB(|ψ〉〈ψ|C ⊗ωS)M†AB→CS , the probability distribution {qi} has the same distribution with the eigenvalues of
the safe state ωS . Now, whenever |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are mutually orthogonal states, we have Tr
√
ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
√
ΦM (|φ〉〈φ|) =∑
i qi| 〈φi|ψi〉 |2 = Tr
[
MCS→AB(|ψ〉〈ψ|C ⊗
√
ωS)MCS→ABM
†
AB→CS(|φ〉〈φ|C ⊗
√
ωS)M
†
AB→CS
]
= | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2 = 0.
Therefore | 〈φi|ψi〉 |2 = | 〈φ|M†iMi |ψ〉 |2 = 0 for all i. This proves that Mi is isometry for all i. Now, from the
masking condition, the quantum channel TrB [ΦM (·)] =
∑
i qiMi ·M†i is a randomization scheme [18] and therefore,
from the result of the Ref. [18], the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution {qi}, which is the von Neumann
entorpy of the safe state ωS , is at least 2 log2 d.
Theorem 3. For arbitrary d ≥ 2, universal quantum masker exists for d-dimensional quantum system that consumes
log2 d bits of randomness.
Proof. The 4-qubit masker can be easily generalized to d-dimensional systems by replacing the 2-dimensional
controlled-X gates with its d-dimensional generalization given as
UC−X |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |x⊕ y (mod d)〉 ,
for x, y = 0, ..., d− 1 and replacing the Hadamard gate with the discrete Fourier transform gate,
UDFT =
d−1∑
i=0
∣∣˜i〉〈i∣∣ ,
where|n˜〉 := ∑d−1j=0 exp(i2pinj/d) |j〉 , for n = 0, ..., d − 1. In this case, the output state for a pure input state |ψ〉 =∑d−1
i=0 αi |i〉 , is given as
ρoutput =
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|Ψi〉〈Ψi|A1B1 ⊗ |Φi〉〈Φi|A2B2 ,
8where
|Ψn〉 :=
d−1∑
j=0
αn⊕j (mod d) |j〉 ⊗ |j〉 ,
and
|Φn〉 := 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ei
2pijn
d |j〉 ⊗ |j〉 ,
for n = 0, ..., d− 1.
For every d ≥ 2, tracing out B1B2 system yields the maximally mixed state for the system A1A2 and vice versa.
For general mixed states, from the linearity of quantum processes, the marginal state of the output state will be a
mixture of maximally mixed marginal states, which is again the maximally mixed state. This shows that the given
quantum process can mask any quantum state. As to the recoverability condition, since this operation consists of
unitary operation after the attachment of ancillary system, simple inverse unitary operation followed by tracing out
of the ancillary systems recovers the input system.
Theorem 4. Universal quantum masking is impossible without quantum correlation.
Proof. For a universal masking process ΦM , having no quantum correlation in the masked quantum state implies the
following expression for any input state ρC .
ΦM (ρ) =
∑
ij
pij(ρ) |i〉〈i|A ⊗ |j〉〈j|B ,
where pij(ρ) is a joint probability distribution for indices i and j linear in the state ρ and {|i〉A} and {|j〉B} are
respectively eigenbasis of TrB [ΦM (ρ)] and TrA[ΦM (ρ)] which are independent of the input state ρ. From the proof of
Theorem 3, however, ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|C) also permits the following expression for any input state |ψ〉.
ΦM (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
∑
i
qiMi |ψ〉〈ψ|M†i ⊗ |i〉〈i|B .
This implies that pij(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = qj for only one i and 0 otherwise and that
√
pij(|ψ〉〈ψ|) |i〉A =
√
qjMj |ψ〉C . However
the image of the right hand side of the equation with varying vector |ψ〉C is a d−dimensional subspace of HA, but
the image of the left hand side is included in the union of the rays spanned by basis elements |i〉A. As the latter is
strictly smaller than the former, we have contradiction.
Theorem 5. The initializer qudit-commitment scheme is unconditionally and perfectly concealing.
Proof. The quantum state U |Ωi〉〈Ωi|SK U† distributed by Ted to Alice and Bob in the SETUP protocol gets averaged
to the maximally mixed state on the subspace supp(ωS) ⊗ supp(ωK), ωS ⊗ ωK = 1rΠsupp(ωS) ⊗ 1rΠsupp(ωK), if one
lacks the knowledge of the index i or the random unitary U . As the system S is in the state ωS for both parties
in the beginning of the COMMIT protocol, the quantum masker successfully masks the input state, so the perfect
concealing condition holds.
Theorem 6. The initializer qudit-commitment scheme is unconditionally quantum binding.
Proof. In this case, the fidelity is given as (provided that Alice has reported the value j instead of the true value i):
Fij =
∫
dU | 〈φ,Ωj |CSK U†SKM†AB→CSVAMCS→ABUSK |ψ,Ωi〉CSK |2,
where MCS→AB is the unitary operator used in the quantum masker and VA is a unitary operator applied by Alice
in trying to deceive Bob. One can use the following expression
| 〈φ|U†MU |ψ〉 |2 = 〈φ| ⊗ 〈ψ| (U† ⊗ U†)(M† ⊗M)(U ⊗ U) |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 .
We utilize a fact about the symmetric twirling that [25]∫
dU(U† ⊗ U†)(M† ⊗M)(U ⊗ U) = (γIGG′ + δFGG′)⊕ (ΠG⊥⊗G′⊥)(M† ⊗M)(ΠG⊥⊗G′⊥),
9where dU is the Haar measure over the set of unitary operators V such that V |g〉 = |g〉 for all |g〉 ∈ G⊥, ΠT is the
orthogonal projection operator onto a given subspace T , and FGG′ is the swapping operator between two subspaces G
and G′ with
γ =
d|TrM |2 − Tr((M† ⊗M)F )
d(d2 − 1) ,
δ =
dTr
(
(M† ⊗M)F )− |TrM |2
d(d2 − 1) .
Note that if the unitary is only applied to a subsystem S then by modifying F → FS and Tr→ TrS we can substitute
γ and δ with appropriate operator values. Then, by letting∣∣Iiψ〉 := |ψ〉C ⊗ |Ωi〉SK
and
MV := M
†
AB→CS(VA ⊗ IB)MCS→AB
we have
Fij =
〈
Iiψ
∣∣⊗ 〈Ijφ∣∣∣ (TrS Πsupp(ω)M†V )⊗ (TrS′ Πsupp(ω)MV )⊗ (r2I − F ⊕Πsupp(ωS)⊥⊗supp(ωK)⊥r4 − 1
)
SKS′K′
∣∣∣Ijφ〉⊗ ∣∣Iiψ〉
+
〈
Iiψ
∣∣⊗ 〈Ijφ∣∣∣ (TrSKS′K′(M†V ⊗MV )(ICC′ ⊗ F ))⊗ (r2F ⊕Πsupp(ω)⊥⊗supp(ωK)⊥ − Ir2(r4 − 1)
)
SKS′K′
∣∣∣Ijφ〉⊗ ∣∣Iiψ〉 ,
where r is the rank of ω and the primed subsystems are copies of their unprimed counterparts and F is the swapping
operator between the spaces supp(ωS)⊗ supp(ωK) and supp(ωS′)⊗ supp(ωK′). Note that
(I ⊗ F )
∣∣∣Ijφ〉⊗ ∣∣Iiψ〉 = ∣∣Iiφ〉⊗ ∣∣∣Ijψ〉
and that the factor TrSKS′K′((M
†
V ⊗MV )(ICC′ ⊗ F )) can be expressed as rTrS(MVM†V Πsupp(ωS)). Now we define
AV := (〈φ|C ⊗Πsupp(ω))MV (|ψ〉C ⊗Πsupp(ω)),
note that this is not a scalar value. For the case of i = j,
Fii =
|TrAV |2
r2 + 1
+
TrA†VAV
r(r2 + 1)
≤ r
2| 〈φ|ψ〉 |2 + 1
r2 + 1
,
where we used the facts
TrA†VAV =
r−1∑
i=0
〈ψ, oi|CSM†V (|φ〉〈φ|C ⊗Πsupp(ωS))MV |ψ, oi〉CS ≤ r
with {|oi〉S} being the eigenbasis of ωS , which holds since MV is unitary and ‖(|φ〉〈φ|C ⊗Πsupp(ω)S )‖op = 1, and
max
V
|TrAV | = max
V
|TrBV |
with
BV := (VA ⊗ 1B)MCS→AB(|ψ〉〈φ| ⊗Πsupp(ωS))M†AB→CS .
Note that TrBV = TrAV . As TrBV = rTr(VA TrB(ΦM (|ψ〉〈φ|))), we use the following expression for ΦM (|ψ〉〈φ|)
ΦM (|ψ〉〈φ|) = (1 + Re 〈φ|ψ〉)ΦM (|R〉〈R|)− ΦM
( |ψ〉〈ψ|+ |φ〉〈φ|
2
)
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+i(1 + Im 〈φ|ψ〉)ΦM (|I〉〈I|)− iΦM
( |ψ〉〈ψ|+ |φ〉〈φ|
2
)
where |R〉 := (2+2 Re 〈φ|ψ〉)− 12 (|ψ〉+ |φ〉) and |I〉 := (2+2 Im 〈φ|ψ〉)− 12 (|ψ〉+ i |φ〉). Now, from the masking property,
for any quantum state ρ, TrB ΦM (ρ) = σA for a fixed quantum state σA. Therefore we have
TrB(ΦM (|ψ〉〈φ|)) = 〈φ|ψ〉σA.
However, from a property of the Schatten 1-norm [20],
‖M‖1 = max
V
|Tr(MV )|,
we have
|TrAV |2 ≤ r2| 〈φ|ψ〉 |2,
By letting VA = IA Alice can achieve the fidelity | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2, so the best fidelity is in the interval
[
| 〈φ|ψ〉 |2, r2|〈φ|ψ〉|2+1r2+1
]
,
but the gap closes as r →∞.
For the case i 6= j, only the terms with the swapping operator F survive.
Fij =
rTrA†VAV − |TrAV |2
r4 − 1 ≤
r2
r4 − 1
As this value is bigger than that of the case of i = j when 〈φ|ψ〉 = 0, Alice might try to deceive Bob by lying about
the value of i, but note that this fidelity vanishes as r → ∞. We can also see that if | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2 ≥ r2/(r4 − 1), being
honest about the value of i is the best option for Alice. As the 4-qubit masker and the 3-qubit masker introduced in
this Letter can be generalized to the case of arbitrarily large r, we have the result.
Theorem 7. Ted learns nothing about the secret qubit.
Proof. Ted only participates in the SETUP protocol. Obviously Ted learns nothing about the secret qubit.
Theorem 8. The 3-qudit masker qudit commitment protocol with a trusted initializer has state-revealing property.
Proof. For the case of the 3-qudit masker, we have Πsupp(ω) = 1 and r = d
2. So the probability of Bob to measure
the system S and K in the state |Ωi〉SK in the REVEAL protocol is
Pi =
d2|TrVA|2 + 1
d4 + 1
where as the probability for measurement outcome to be |Ωj〉SK for any j 6= i is
Pj =
d2(d2 − |TrVA|2)
d8 − 1 .
Note that for |TrVA|2 ≥ d−6, Pi ≥ Pj , therefore reporting i to Bob in the REVEAL protocol is still the best option
for Alice to be accepted for large enough d. For |TrVA|2 < d−6, Alice’s acceptance probability is less than d4/(d8−1),
therefore negligible for large enough d. Then the fidelity of the postmeasurement state of the system A and the initial
committed state |ψ〉A is given as
F (|ψ〉 , ρpostA ) =
d2|TrVA|+ 1d2
∑
ij
∣∣〈ψ|X−jZ−iV ZiXj |ψ〉∣∣2
d2|TrVA|2 + 1 .
However, from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1d2
∑
ij
〈ψ|X−jZ−iVAZiXj |ψ〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 1
d2
∑
ij
∣∣〈ψ|X−jZ−iVAZiXj |ψ〉∣∣2 ,
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where the left hand side reduces to∣∣∣∣∣∣Tr
VA 1
d2
∑
ij
ZiXj |ψ〉〈ψ|X−jZ−i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
d2
|TrVA|2.
So, we have
F (|ψ〉 , ρpostA ) ≥
(d2 + d−2)|TrVA|2
d2|TrVA|2 + 1 ≥
1
d2
|TrVA|2.
Therefore, if Alice wants Pi ≥ 1− , then |TrVA|2 ≥ 1d2 ((1− )(1 + d4)− 1) and
F (|ψ〉 , ρpostA ) ≥ 1−
(
1 +
1
d4
)
.
However, notice that this fidelity is an average fidelity over the Haar measrue dU . For a given unitary U on the system
S and K, from the reverse Markov inequality, the probability of the fidelity between |ψ〉 and the postmeasurement
state larger than 1− n is given as
P (F > 1− n) ≥ 1− 1
n
(
1 +
1
d4
)
.
Hence, by increasing the security parameter 1/ enough so that even for a large n, n becomes small, we have the
high probability of high fidelity.
